Constructivism IV: Ernst von Glasersfeld

These days, Ernst von Glasersfeld seems to have been anointed the patron saint of constructivism.  He has published what, I think, turns out to be an extremely ironic attempt to bracket the essential position of “radical” constructivism to protect it from criticisms that realists like Paul Boghossian have made of his paradigm:

[Radical constructivism] holds that knowledge is under all circumstances constructed by individual thinkers as an adaption to their subjective experience.  This is its working hypothesis and from it follows that for a constructivist there cannot be anything like a body of unquestionable knowledge…What matters in the end is that the constructs actually work and do not involve contradictions.  Radical constructivism, therefore, cannot be a metaphysical system, nor can it claim to be “true.” Indeed, radical constructivists never say:  “This is how it is!” They merely suggest:  “This may be how it functions” (“Problems” 4).

You will notice, no doubt, the difficulty he has in refraining from stating positively that “This is how it is!”  In stating constructivism “holds…under all circumstances,” he is making a truth claim.  Similarly, notice the lack of hesitation in the sentences “…there cannot be anything like a body of unquestionable knowledge” and “Radical constructivism…cannot be a metaphysical system.”  In using truth claim language, he provides the very contradiction he seeks to avoid.

Additionally, with Piaget, von Glasersfeld rejects any notion of our ability to mentally represent the real world.  He aligns himself with the 18^th Century Italian Giambattista Vico:  “‘The human mind can know only what the human mind has made’” (“Exposition” 3).  Again, “This is how it is!”

It further stretches credibility to claim that knowledge’s sole function is to allow us to adapt to our subjective experience.  That the distant approach of a saber-tooth tiger was objectively real enough to induce our ancestor to either skedaddle or organize a defense seems a more likely evolutionary explanation of how we often use knowledge.  Representation is what allows us to imagine what those teeth will do if they get too close.  “Providing our adaptation to our subjective experience” is in contrast pretty abstract—by what specific mechanism other than representation will our ancestor judge to run or call for help?

Lastly, I wonder what von Glasersfeld means when he declares that “What matters in the end is that the constructs actually work.”   By what standard is anyone to judge?  Von Glasersfeld rejects solipsism, but doesn’t explain how the knowledge-constructing person avoids it if her social life is not self correcting:  we certainly know enough by now about the madness of crowds, Malcolm Gladwell to the contrary notwithstanding.  If it is the individual’s standards that matter, do alcoholism or drug dependency count?  If our purpose is merely a Benthamite reduction of pain—and von Glasersfeld doesn’t seem to rule that out—we are setting a pretty low bar for the good life.

It is not necessary to succumb to Kant’s or Piaget’s or von Glasersfeld’s pessimism about our ability to know the world.  Though it exists beyond our ability to know it, and our knowledge is often conjectural (Popper 29, Weissman 66ff), and we do make mistakes that we work hard to eliminate, human thriving has been possible because we have measured our progress against what is, and not what merely works for us idiosyncratically.  Not recognizing objective reality has high costs:  personal, political, economic, environmental, pedagogical, and moral.

References

Glasersfeld, Ernst Von.  “An Exposition of Constructivism:  Why Some Like It Radical.”  Ernst von Glasersfield.  Web. 30 Jan. 2016. <http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/EvG/

 

Glasersfeld, Ernst Von. "Problems of Constructivism." Radical Constructivism in Action: Building on the Pioneering Word of Ernst Von Glasersfeld. Ed. Leslie P. Steffe and Patrick W. Thompson. Vol. 15. New York': Routledge Falmer, 2000. EBSCO. Print. Studies in Mathematics Education. 3-9. 

 

Popper, Karl R. "Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution to the Problem of Induction." Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon. 1-31. Print.

 

Weissman, David. Truth's Debt to Value. New Haven: Yale UP, 1993. Print.